MAJOR COURT DECISIONS, SPRING

TIME WARNER

ENTERTAINMENT

CO. V.

FCC 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communication
Commission's (the "FCC" or "Commission") regulations limiting a cable operator's channels and
subscribers are an unconstitutional infringement
of freedom of speech, exceed statutory authority
and are a product of arbitrary and capricious decision making in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Also, whether the FCC's rules for
determining what constitutes an "attributable interest" violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
Holding: The court reversed and remanded for
further consideration, and vacated specific portions of the attribution rules as lacking justification. It held that the FCC did not meet its burden
under the First Amendment and lacks statutory
authority for its actions.
Discussion: Applying intermediate scrutiny, the
court held that although the FCC is able to exercise its regulatory power to preserve competition,
it failed to justify the limits it had chosen as not
substantially burdening more speech than necessary. Further, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by failing to show
that anti-competitive behavior occurred or was
likely to occur, thus justifying the regulatory limits. The court referred to the FCC's justifications
as nothing more than "economic commonplace,"
i.e. that more firms equal more competition.
WORLDCOM, INc. V. FCC 238 F.3d 449
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
Issue: Whether an FCC order granting incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") greater
pricing flexibility was arbitrary or capricious, compromised the FCC's obligation to ensure reasonable rates and was supported by substantial evidence.
Holding: In affirming the lower court's denial

of long distance telephone service providers petition for review, the court held that the FCC made

a reasonable policy determination that collocation was a sufficient proxy for market power in determining whether to grant pricing flexibility to
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LECs and was not arbitrary and capricious. Fur-

ther, the court held that the FCC sufficiently explained the basis for its decision.
Discussion: Recently, the FCC sought to increase competition in the telecommunications industry, mainly in response to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"). The 1996 Act
sought to "promote competition and reduce regulation." The court held that the FCC's Order
granting LEC's greater pricing flexibility was not
arbitrary or capricious because the collocation
thresholds it established were rational. The court
held that the FCC'sjudgment in selecting "regulatory tools" should be given great deference.

MC/DC/DE

BROADCASTERS

ASS'N

V.

FCC 236 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether the FCC's Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) rules are violations of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Holding: While the broadcasters failed to substantiate their argument that the EEO rules were
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA,
the court found that the rules did not withstand
strict scrutiny. The court held that the rules were
not narrowly tailored and did not further a compelling governmental interest.
Discussion: The EEO rules were separated into
two parts. A licensee had the option of complying
with either provision. Option A required a licensee to participate in four "approved recruitment
initiatives" every two years. Option B allowed
licensees to establish their own recruitment program, but they would be required to report to the
FCC the race and sex of every applicant, as well as
the source from which the individual was recruited. While the court found that Option A was
tailored narrowly enough to survive judicial scrutiny, Option B was not. To make this determination, the court focused upon decisions in Lutheran
Church-MissouriSynod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Lutheran Church, the court
found a similar EEO rule to be an unconstitu-
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tional race-based classification; in Adarand, the Supreme Court determined that all race-based classifications require strict scrutiny. Therefore, the
court came to the final determination that "the
rule ... put[s] official pressure upon broadcasters
to recruit minority candidates, thus creating a
race-based classification that is not narrowly tailored to support a compelling governmental interest and is therefore unconstitutional." Because
the court found that severing references to minorities would "severely distort the Commission's program and produce a rule strikingly different," it
vacated the rule.

ASS'N

OF

COMMUNICATIONS

ENTERS.

V.

FCC 235 F.3d 662 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Issue: Whether the FCC may approve the transfer of Commission licenses in the context of a
merger without the required resale obligations for
advanced services of Section 251 (c) of the 1996
Act.
Holding: The court vacated the order of the
Commission, by determining that the requirements of Section 251 (c) cannot be circumvented
by transferring licenses to and offering advanced
services through a separate affiliate. Such action
would thwart the intent of Congress in creating
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Discussion: The 1996 Act requires that an ILEC
sell its licenses to its "successors and assigns." The
Commission circumvented this requirement by
determining that the advanced services affiliate
was not a successor or assign. The appellant argued that "the Commission's order is simply a device to accomplish indirectly what the statute
clearly forbids: the Commission's exercise of forbearance authority over an ILEC's provision of advanced services." After examining statutory language and congressional intent, the court agreed
with the appellant. It decided that allowing the
definition of "successor and assign to exclude the
transfer of advanced services to an affiliate," allows an ILEC to avoid the specific provisions of
Section 251(c). The court also used Section 272
of the 1996 Act as evidence of the fact that Congress determined that an ILEC may provide services through an affiliate.

BELLSOUTH

TELECOMMS.,

INC.

CAROLINA UTILITIES COMM'N

V.

NORTH

240 F.3d 270

(4th Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether the district court erred by finding that it had jurisdiction over the North Carolina Utilities Commission's ("NCUC") decision
that required the incumbent, BellSouth, to pay
competing carriers reciprocal compensation for
telephone calls made by BellSouth's customers to
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") served by competing carriers.
Holding: The Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court's judgment and remanded with instructions
to dismiss the case because any judicial review of
the Commission's administration of interconnection agreements entered into by public utility
companies should be performed by the North
Carolina state courts as provided by state law and
preserved by the 1996 Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 62-90, 62-96 (1999). In addition, the Fourth
Circuit found that the district court erred in asserting federal jurisdiction under Section
252(e) (6) of the 1996 Act.
Discussion: The court relied on its previous decision in Bell Atlantic v. MCI WorldCom, 240 F.3d
279 (4th Cir. 2001), in which the court rejected a
similar argument and reasoned that the 1996 Act
may be fairly construed to condition State participation in regulation under the 1996 Act, upon
their consent to federal review of state commission determinations made under Section 252. But
the 1996 Act makes no reference to any authorization to sue the State itself in federal court or to
allow states to waive their Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Therefore, the court held that: (1)
NCUC did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it accepted regulatory authority over
the interconnection process pursuant to the 1996
Act; (2) the district court was required to decide
the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue at outset of hearing the case; (3) NCUC was entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity; (4) the district
court lacked jurisdiction, tinder the 1996 Act,
over claims challenging NCUC's enforcement decisions; and (5) general federal jurisdictional statutes did not operate to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction over the Commission's
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administration of interconnection agreements entered into by public utility companies because the
1996 Act provided such jurisdiction to state
courts.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL.
FIBER COMMUNICATIONS

Co.

V. BROOKS

OF OKLAHOMA,

INC. 235 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 2000)
Issue: Whether an Interconnection Agreement
pursuant to Section 251(b) (5) of the 1996 Act,
which entitled a local exchange carrier to receive
reciprocal compensation for local traffic, includes
traffic delivered to ISPs within the same local exchange.
Holding: The court upheld the Oklahoma state
commission's decision that reciprocal compensation is due between carriers following whatever
compensation arrangement the parties have contractually established through their interconnection agreement.
Discussion: The court first adopted the view that
the Act gives state commissions the authority to
not only approve interconnection agreements,
but also interpret and enforce specific provisions.
Then, the court stated that state commissions
must interpret and enforce in accordance with
federal law and that federal, not state, courts must
review the state commission's findings. Federal
court review extends to state contract law. In this
case, because the Agreement defined local traffic
as traffic that originates and terminates within a
local exchange area, calls from an end-user to an
ISP in the same local calling area are subject to
the reciprocal compensation rate. The court also
concluded that calls to ISPs are terminating traffic
subject to reciprocal compensation.
AT&T CORP. v. FCC 236 F.3d 729 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether a petition for forbearance from
"dominant carrier" regulation fails to make a
prima facie showing of sufficient competition, if
the carrier does not provide market share data.
Holding: The court held that the FCC erred by
denying a telecommunication carrier's petition
for forbearance from "dominant carrier" regulation on the ground that market share data was
critical to a prima facie showing of competition,
absent explanation for the change in agency position, which had previously considered market

share data as only one of several factors for determining existence of competition.
Discussion: The FCC has previously assessed
whether a carrier retains market power but it has
never viewed market share as an essential factor in
their determination of competition. In fact, the
FCC acknowledges several factors that are considered, including, but not limited to: market share,
supply substitutability, elasticity of demand and
the cost structure, size, and resources of the carrier. Further, the FCC has also viewed market
share as irrelevant where other evidence suggested that the carrier lacked market power. Until
the FCC articulates a satisfactory explanation for
making market share data necessary for a prima
facie case, it has not discharged its statutory obligation. The court also clarified that any relief that
may be available under the FCC's pricing flexibility order is independent of Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications
Act").

PROSTAR V. MASSACHI

239 F.3d 669 (5th

Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether the appropriate statute of limitations for an action brought under the Communications Act of 1934 is one year, as provided
under Louisiana law, or three years as articulated
in the Federal Copyright Act.
Holding: The district court was reversed and
the case remanded where the Copyright Act limitations period and not the Louisiana state law provision was applied under the Communications
Act.
Discussion: The court concluded that the Copyright Act provides a "closer fit" than the Louisiana
conversion law. The application of state conversion laws in each of the fifty states would result in
widely varying limitation periods. Specifically, the
court found that the Copyright Act and the Communications Act both protect proprietary rights in
the context of cable transmissions. The Copyright
Act prohibits infringement by "anyone who violated any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner." Infringement encompasses the unauthorized performance or display of motion pictures
and other audiovisual works. Moreover, the statute explicitly prohibits infringement in the context of secondary transmissions by cable systems.
The unauthorized access and retransmission of
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cable broadcasting, which the Communications
Act prohibits, does not deprive the licensee of its
license. Whereas conversion requires the wrongful deprivation of one's possession of property,
the Copyright Act provides for liability when mere
copying occurs, rendering it a more appropriate
analogue to the Communications Act.
NEW

JERSEY PAYPHONE
TOWN OF WEST NEW YORK,

ASS'N,

INC.

V.

130 F. Supp. 2d
631 (N.J. 2001)
Issue: Whether an ordinance adopted by the
Town of West New York requiring prospective pay
telephone operators to obtain a permit for each
pay telephone specifying each telephone's exact
location violates the United States and New Jersey
Constitutions, and New Jersey Statutory law and is
preempted by the express provisions of the 1996
Act.
Holding: The court held that the ordinance was
void and was preempted by the 1996 Act as unrelated to municipality's legitimate powers.
Discussion: The court concluded that the ordinance regulating pay telephones provided for the
award of an exclusive franchise, based to a significant extent on the amount of compensation the
Town of West New York would receive. The stated
purpose of the ordinance was to regulate the
physical occupation of West New York's rights of
way in the interest of avoiding pedestrian traffic
problems. The court did not reach the constitutional questions, but instead held that the 1996
Act preempted the ordinance. The exclusive
franchise provision was unrelated to West New
York's legitimate traffic management powers and
bore no relation to the "fair and reasonable compensation" for the use of the public right-of-way
that the law permitted.
MCI WORLDCOM,
INC. 239 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether an informal complaint by a telecommunications provider to the FCC invoked the
FCC's jurisdiction to prevent the provider from
filing a complaint for the same injury in district
court.
Holding: An informal complaint to the FCC
qualifies as a complaint and will preclude the
plaintiff from suing in district court because the
parallel proceedings arose out of the same dispute.
DIGITEL,

INC.

V.
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Discussion: Digitel, Inc., brought suit in United
States District Court alleging that MCI WorldCom
wrongfully permitted Digitel's toll-free number to
be transferred to another customer. Digitel's business relied strongly on the use of the toll-free
number to generate business. When the number
was directed to an unrelated entity, Digitel's business was destroyed. Digitel then wrote a complaint
letter to the FCC and sued in District Court. According to Section 207 of the Communications
Act, a person who is injured by a common carrier
has the choice of either making a complaint to
the FCC or suing in any district court of the
United States. MCI WorldCom argued that Digitel's letter to the FCC invoked FCC jurisdiction.
The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that a filing of an "informal complaint" constitutes a "complaint to the Commission" and therefore the
plaintiff may not sue in district court. The court
did not decide what constitutes an informal complaint.

v. AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD SERCORP. 241 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2001)
Issue: Whether a long-distance provider and its
credit card company can be found liable for damages caused by transmitting and using certain information contained in plaintiffs long-distance
bill for purposes of collecting credit card debt.
Holding: Plaintiffs failed to allege recoverable
damages under the Communications Act and the
1996 Act, or the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.
Discussion: Customers brought a class action
against a long-distance telephone carrier and the
credit card company that was previously affiliated
with the long-distance carrier because the longdistance carrier disseminated proprietary customer information for the purposes of debt collection. Conboy was called on her unpublished
number by a debt collection agency that was looking for Conboy's daughter-in-law who had not
paid debts. The court found that the plaintiffs
could not recover the cost of keeping the number
unpublished because that was a contract between
the plaintiffs and the local provider. The plaintiffs
also could not recover the amount of money that
they spent on long distance during that time period because "the plaintiffs got what they paid for,
namely, long-distance service." The court points
out that the plaintiffs were permitted to file a
CoNBoY
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complaint with the FCC and did not do so. The
FCC could have imposed a number of penalties
for violations of the 1996 Act and regulations.
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